Supreme Court on Harmonious Construction of the Senior Citizens Act and the Domestic Violence Act

Introduction

 

First of all, farewell to the yester year and with the beginning of this new year, let us remember the people who lost their lives protecting us and fighting for us. Let us also hope that this year brings hope and prosperity to the oppressed and the marginalized sections of society and that their dignity and honour remains intact. A happy new year to all of you.

 

In the present post, we shall discuss a latest judicial pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1023, wherein the scheme of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short, “Senior Citizens Act”) and how the same has to be construed qua other enactments, was discussed by the Court.

 

Facts

 

In the present case, an Application was filed by the parents of a person who sought to evict his estranged wife and children from a residential house belonging to the parents (mother). Such Application was allowed by the Courts below and thereafter the matter traversed to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

 

Chief Contentions of the Appellant/Estranged Wife

 

1. The Appellant/Estranged Wife is residing in her matrimonial home, which is a shared household, as a lawfully wedded spouse of the son of the parents who moved the Application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and she cannot be evicted in view of the protection offered by Section 17 (Right to reside in a shared household) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, “Domestic Violence Act”).

 

2. The Appellant/Estranged Wife has no other place to live except the suit premises and relied upon Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act urging that the Senior Citizens Act cannot be invoked to evict her.

 

Chief Contentions of the Parents/Respondent

 

1. Parents/Respondents are Senior Citizens, and the suit premises was constructed by their ancestors.

 

2. There are concurrent findings by all the Courts below who have directed for eviction of the Appellant and restoration of their possession.

 

Observations by the Court

 

Brief Scheme of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007

Provision	Crux
Section 2 (b)	“Maintenance” includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment.
Section 2 (f)	“Property” means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property.
Section 3	It provides that this Act shall have an overriding effect on the other enactments/Acts.
Section 4	It recognises an entitlement of maintenance to inhere in parents and senior citizens.
Section 5	It lays down the procedure by which an application for maintenance can be made.
Section 6	It elucidates provisions governing jurisdiction and procedure.
Section 7	It contains stipulations for the constitution of a Maintenance Tribunal.
Section 8	It envisages a summary procedure for making an inquiry.
Section 9	Monthly allowance can be fixed by the Tribunal for the maintenance of the senior citizen.
Section 10	The above-stated monthly allowance can be altered upon a change in circumstance.
Section 11	It provides for the enforcement of an order of maintenance.
Section 23	If a senior citizen gifts any property to any person subject to the condition that such person shall take care of the basic needs of the senior citizen and when such person does not provide for and take care of the basic needs of the senior citizen, then the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence and can be declared void by the Tribunal. It further provides that where a Senior Citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of a property if the transferee has notice of the right and the transfer of such property is without consideration.

 

‘Means and Includes’ Approach and the Interpretative Process

 

This is relevant for enactments wherein a definition has been provided that involves usage of means and includes. ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ by Justice G.P. Singh observes as under: -

 

“The Legislature has the power to define a word even artificially. So the definition of a word in the definitions section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the same. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive.”

 

“Whereas, where the word defined is declared to ‘include’ such and such, the definition is prime facie extensive. When by an amending Act, the word ‘includes’ was substituted for the word ‘means’ in a definitions section, it was held that the intention was to make it more extensive…..”

 

This ‘means and includes’ approach has been discussed in plethora of cases earlier and in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 997, it was observed as under: -

 

“Further, a definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’, where again the definition is exhaustive.”

 

A Woman’s Right of Residence

 

Section 2 (s) of the Domestic Violence Act defines ‘shared household’ as under: -

 

“‘shared household’ means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;”

 

Thus, by taking recourse to the ‘means and includes’ approach, it was observed by the Court that the definition of ‘shared household’ cannot be read to mean only that household which belongs to the husband or of which the husband is a member and can even include the household belonging to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived.

 

Harmonizing the Senior Citizens Act and the Domestic Violence Act

 

Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, the Domestic Violence is in addition to other remedies and does not displace or override them. However, Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act is unequivocal in its approach that the Senior Citizens Act shall have an overriding effect over all the other enactments.

 

The Court observed that both the Senior Citizens and the Domestic Violence Act are welfare legislations and there is a need to harmoniously construe them. It was further observed that a shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the woman/wife had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property does not vest with the husband or that the estranged spouse is living separately, is no ground to deprive the wife/woman of the protection that was envisaged under the Domestic Violence Act.

 

Held

 

The Court finally held that whether the suit premises constitutes a ‘shared household’ within the meaning of the Domestic Violence or not would have to be determined by the appropriate forum and such a claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant/wife in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007. Even the parents/Respondents were given the liberty to move a subsequent Application under the Senior Citizens Act. Finally, exercising the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court concluded by holding that the Appellant/wife shall not be forcibly dispossessed from the suit premises for a period of one year, to enable the Appellant/wife to pursue her remedies in accordance with law.

 

Concluding Remarks

 

I have my own reservations with the reasoning of the judgment. The Court made a substantial effort to balance the rights of the wife and the in-laws/senior citizen and left the question open for the appropriate forums to decide. The Hon’ble Court did acknowledge in Para 36 of the judgment that though Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act is not a non-obstante clause yet the same has to be construed harmoniously with Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act. I think that it is a settled principle of law that the principle of harmonious construction or looking into the purpose of the legislation becomes relevant only when there is ambiguity in the text of the legislations or when the same is leading to any manifest absurdity. In the present case, the texts of the legislations i.e., Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act and Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, are amply clear and there seems to be no ambiguity arising out of a bare textual reading of these two provisions. Senior Citizens Act is a subsequent legislation and its Section 3 clearly provides for an overriding effect. The entire purpose of enacting Section 3 would be defeated if the overriding effect that it seeks to have is not given effect to. Whether there exists a manifest absurdity exists in the reading and construction of the above-stated provisions is something that requires further scrutiny in my humble opinion. I hope that further clarity emerges in this aspect in the times to come.