Summary of Jim Evan's ‘Sketch of a Theory of Statutory Interpretation'

Summary of ‘Sketch of a Theory of Statutory

Interpretation’ by Jim Evans

New Zealand law review, 2005

Introduction

According to the author of this article scope of ‘Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ shall not be determined by interpreter’s mere understanding of the legislation but along with that an interpreter shall also consider the will of the legislation behind enacting the particular law and when there are two sources of understanding; caution shall assist the process of Interpretation.

This article basically revolves around two different roles of ‘Understanding’ which is 

1. Our understanding of the intended meaning of a statutory rule 
2. Will of the legislature.

Here, in this case an author is trying to convey that, ‘will of the legislature’ means that there is a rule imposing in accordance with the border aim and purposes that the legislature is hope to achieve. Now; there are broader concerns behind an enactment but at the same time an author is speaking about this expression of “Reasons for the rule” which means the conditions which shall at least be pursued in a standard case. For which according to author the real game is of ‘words’ where legislature may communicate a rule which is representing those broader concerns of the enactment and interpreter may respect the rule but not necessarily respect its meaning which can ultimately damage that broader purposes of an enactment.

Now here lets take the case of the laws which are mainly expressed in form of directives and the same intends to shape some action. Author have very intelligently explained it, If there is one law in form instruction or grant of permission or authorization which read as “One can open the window, as per his / her conscious”. Through this directive a lawmaker is well versed with the circumstances present and therefore wants to comply us with it. So; this does not mean that one can throw a chair and open as well as break it and that is how an author is trying to distinguish between meaning intended by the legislature and will of the legislature. To explain it in simple way author said that when an enactment is silent upon reasons for a rule, then one should wonder about the consequences of an undeniable breach of a rule then we understand the meaning of the rule will go in the same direction as actual intended meaning of the rule.

History of Statutory Interpretation within Common Law System

In early days of common law system there was not a single judge who have considered the meaning of the enactment or legislature’s intention ; but contrary to it the main focus was on judgement that a statutory provision evidences. Also no one till this period have experienced any such judgement which have crossed King’s will and every judgement of a king was respected equally; regardless of the language of a statue.

In 1340 maxim ‘privilegia statuti est strictijuris’ ("statute law is strict law"), brought notable strictness in the treatment of statues but too many irrational decisions made chaos and then doctrine got developed with a proviso attached to it which read as statutes affirming the common law could be extended, "on their equity" and form this point always statues were treated differently form common law.

Brief overview of the legal scenario starts from the reign of Edwart III who set up a house of commons in London to create a political influence, then Henry IV in 1407 somewhat started a official procedure to make and enact the laws; where commons and lords used to submit a copy of petition of new law to king and therefore king’s council was authorized make the law according to its aid and advice. Then eventually system developed with the people where a draft of a bill was attached to such petitions because language of the act was the issue then, and then finally the system emerged where the King can only accept or reject the Bill forwarded by commons and lords and not change it which still is the base of today’s law making system. 

Then after 15^th century the tradition of distribution of copies of the enactments in the realm came into existence and this was the time when according to St German’s theory something called interpretation based on meaning of the statute emerged; because the reason being that lawyers had already developed a theory about statutes extended on their equity.

In 1550 there was this case of Reniger v Fogossa[1] where there was an issue of breaking the words of the law and not the law actually so; while giving an argument the counsel for the defendant proved it very bravely and got all the lords in his favor which resulted into withdrawing of appeal and hence for first time an interpretation of a certain statue in the light “Reasons for the rule” played an important role.

Till the end of the 18^th Century the combination and confusion of the un-examined theory of “the equity of the statue” and its loose practice in orthodox way was going on and that was the reason author thinks;  the established doctrine never covered the conflict between equitable exception and corrective extension. 

Legislative Meaning

Here is this chapter an author is taking readers again to the point of “Reasons for the rule” which he explained in Introduction; and rephrasing it as ‘Language does not work by conventions alone’. People usually use conventions to construct sentences but when time comes to construe or interpret those sentence; an interpreter would take it in any way the convention goes; which becomes a reason for real chaos.

The same thing can happen in relation to statutes and the consequences are only two either one will interpret in the way legislature wants to convey it or can take advantage of it as per his interests. Further, it is often not necessary for an interpreter to recognize a literal meaning of an utterance as a whole while one shall recognizing the non-literal meaning that the author apparently intended a component of it to bear. So; there is possibility of the case where an  author can use a component of an utterance in a non-literal sense and expect the meaning to be recognized directly by the interpreter, without expecting the interpreter to first contemplate a literal meaning of the utterance as a whole.

While explaining this particular scenario of ‘Legislative Meaning’ author cited an example of Smith vs. United States[2] ; this case was argued upon the federal law which read as "during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime, uses or carries a firearm" and the facts were that, that the defendant had offered his machine gun to a pawnbroker in exchange for cocaine in United States and the United States Supreme Court ruled on an appeal in which a defendant had been given a mandatory 30 years' imprisonment for a drug trafficking crime. The majority held that, yes, the defendant had used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, since trading was one form of use as far as the mandatory term stood. But Justice Scalia, who was in minority held that, in the context, "uses a firearm" meant "uses a firearm as a weapon". Hence; here we catch the difference between the conventional meaning of the rule and reasons for the rule as Justice Scalia understanding goes into the communication of meaning of the statute while the majority goes with the conventional meaning of the words of statutes.

Respect for the Will of the Legislature

Here in this chapter author have thrown light upon two major extensions of previous chapter of will of the legislature.

1. Exceptions to the rule.

2. Imposition of Side Constrained.

Exceptions to the rule

Here in this section author have notified that the history has showed us that making exceptions to the meaning of a provision runs the obvious danger of damaging it but on the other hand exceptions are required in order to determine the reliability of statute and public policy and the answer author gave is to allow exceptions only when it would be obvious to an informed interpreter that the case lies outside the will of the legislature.

When a case come in front of the court of law which involves a conflict of values then it is not necessary that for the legislature to already addressed to such conflict of values and make the law and therefore to bring this exceptions to the rule in reality the author suggests that the due responsibility of the court to be consistent with the will of the legislature, it must be made from the perspective of a lawmaker who remains committed to the reasons for the rule that were apparently sought to justify it and this can be done by common understanding of values and its priorities.

Imposition of Side-Constrained

Side-constraints are not reasons for or against any act but they are simply reasons for not doing it in a certain way if there are otherwise good reasons for doing it. When the legislature permits or authorizes an act, the courts sometimes take it as permitting or authorizing the act only for those ways of performing it that observe appropriate side-constraints and therefore by imposing such a constraint the Court was supplementing, but not crossing, the will of the legislature.

For better understanding an example given by author is when a statute gives some person or body permission to carry out work on private land, the work must be carried out with care to avoid unnecessary harm to the landowner while on the other hand constraints imposed by administrative law on the statutory grant of powers to public authorities can be seen as the imposition of side-constraints.

Critical Analysis of Article

Author by drawing the threads together finally tried to convey the readers that the meaning of the statutes and the will of the legislature both go hand in hand depending upon the circumstances court of law may face which shall ultimately judged under the light of important social values require courts to protect reliance on the apparent meaning of rules.

In this article of ‘Sketch theory of statutory Interpretation’ author Jim Evans have tried to convey the importance of interpretation in light of understanding the “Reasons for the enactment” and not by mere understanding of the language of an enactment or the broader objectives which the legislature want to achieve.

So; I would like to analyze the message of the author in three brief points which are broadly my understanding of this article from New Zealand Law review.  

1. Going beyond the reasons for the enactment means by the understanding the consequences of the breach of a rule is the best understanding use full for interpretation of any statute.
2. Common understanding of Human beings and society in the light of contradictory values always help best in interpretation particularly when one have a judge a scenario by making an exception to the rule.
3. Interpretation of an enactment with the side-constraints is good when the side-constraint is consistent with the point of law.

Hence; there is a need of special application process of which we can uniformly employ in the interpretation of the language but after all it all depends on self consciousness of the interpreter.

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[1] (1550) 1 Plowd 1; 75 ER 1

[2] (1993) 508 US 223; 124 L Ed 2d 138