Pages

Monday, June 23, 2014

Removal of Governor in India is open to Judicial Review



The question whether the removal of Governor is open to Judicial Review has been beautifully explained by the Court in the case B.P. Singhal v. Union of India. Here are some of the important parts of the Judgment.

When a Governor holds office during the pleasure of the Government and the power to remove at the pleasure of the President is not circumscribed by any conditions or restrictions, it follows that the power is exercisable at any time, without assigning any cause.

However, there is a distinction between the need for a cause for the removal, and the need to disclose the cause for removal. While the President need not disclose or inform the cause for his removal to the Governor, it is imperative that a cause must exist.

If we do not proceed on that premise, it would mean that the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may make any order which may be manifestly arbitrary or whimsical or mala fide. Therefore, while no cause or reason be disclosed or assigned for removal by exercise of such prerogative power, some valid cause should exist for the removal.

Therefore, even though it cannot be said that an order under Article 156 is not justiciable, but it could very well be inferred that no reason need be assigned and no cause need be shown and no notice need be issued to the Governor before removing a Governor.

This Court has examined in several cases, the scope of judicial review with reference to another prerogative power – power of the President/Governor to grant pardon etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences. The view of the Court is that the power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and not an act of grace as in England. It is a constitutional responsibility to be exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not a matter of privilege but a matter of performance of official duty. All public power including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide.

While the President or the Governor may be the sole Judge of the sufficiency of facts and the propriety of granting pardons and reprieves, the power being an enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations must be found in the Constitution itself.

In the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India[1], the Court held that Article 74(2) merely bars an inquiry into the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President but does not bar the scrutiny of the material on the basis of which the President has made the order.

Therefore, though the sufficiency of the material could not be questioned, legitimacy of the inference drawn from such material is open to judicial review.

Article 156(1) provides that a Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. Having regard to Article 74, the President is bound to act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, even though under Article 156(1), the removal is at the pleasure of the President, the exercise of such pleasure is restricted by the requirement that it should be on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

The President in exercising power under Article 156(1) should act in a manner which is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. In the event of challenge of withdrawal of the pleasure, the court will necessarily assume that it is for compelling reasons. Consequently, where the aggrieved person is not able to establish a prima facie instance of arbitrariness or mala fides, in his removal, the court will refuse to interfere. However, where a prima facie case of arbitrariness or mala fides is made out, the Court can require the Union Government to produce records/materials to satisfy itself that the withdrawal of pleasure was for good and compelling reasons. What will constitute good and compelling reasons would depend upon the facts of the case.

Having regard to the nature of functions of the Governor in maintaining centre-state relations, and the flexibility available to the Government in such matters, it is needless to say that there will be no interference unless a very strong case is made out. The position, therefore, is that the decision is open to judicial review but in a very limited extent.




[1] 1994 (3) SCC 1.

No comments:

Post a Comment