Statutory Interpretation
1. Rule of
Literal Construction- ‘The first and most elementary rule of
construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of
technical legislations are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired
one, and otherwise in the ordinary meaning, and the second is that the phrases
and sentences are to be constructed according to the rules of grammar’.
Therefore, it is desirable to adhere to the words of the Act of the Parliament
giving to them the sense which is their natural import in the order in which
they are placed[1].
The length and detail of modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the
claim of Literal Construction as the only safe rule[2].
2. Mischief
Rule or Purposive Construction- When the true intention of the legislature
cannot be determined by the language of the statute in question, it is open to
the court to consider the historical basis underlying the statute. The court
may consider the circumstances that led to the introduction of the bill, also
to the circumstances in which it became the law. However, when judges are
allowed to probe into questions of policy in interpreting statutes, there is
bound to be some uncertainty. It is maintained that the judges may look at the
law prevailing before the enactment of the Act and the mischief in the law that
the statute sought to remedy. The act is to be construed in such a manner as
to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. This rule is known as
Mischief Rule. The Heydon’s Case laid down following considerations while
construing an Act:
a. What was the
common law before the making of the Act?
b. What was the
mischief or defect for which the common law did not provide?
c. What remedy
the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease?
d. What is the
true reason of the remedy?
And then the
office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro private commando, and
to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of
the makers of the Act, pro bono publico[3].
Smith v.
Hughes[4]-
Lord Justice Parker tried to find out mischief in the Street Offences Act,
1959. Under the Street Offences Act, it was a crime for prostitutes to “loiter
or solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution”. The defendants
were calling to men in the street from balconies and tapping on windows. They
claimed they were not guilty as they were not in the “street”. The judge
applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as
the intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from
prostitutes.
3. Golden
Rule- It is a modified version of the Rule of Literal Construction.
Although it is useful to adhere to the literal rule of construction, yet if the
ordinary meaning is at variance with the intention of the legislature, it is to
be collected from the statute itself. If it leads to manifest absurdity or
repugnance, the language may be varied to avoid such inconvenience. Secondly,
if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to
discard the more natural meaning if it leads to absurdity and adopt that
interpretation that leads to a practicable and reasonable result. Therefore,
court when faced with two possible constructions of legislative language, looks
at the result by adopting each of the alternatives in the quest for
ascertaining the true intention of the parliament. Thus, the Golden Rule is
that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning “unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words
are used requires a different meaning”.
4. construction
ut res magis valeat quam pereat- The Courts strongly lean against a
construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting
provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative “.
It is an application of this principle that courts while pronouncing upon the
constitutionality of a statute start with a presumption in favour of
constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the statute within the
competence of the legislature[5].
Where
alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen
which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the
statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which
will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the
system[6]. Therefore, in accordance
with these principles, the courts should avoid interpretations which would
leave any part of the law to be interpreted without affect. The courts will not
narrow down the enactments but it may give a wide sense to the words in the
statute.
5. Rule of
Beneficial Construction- If a section in a remedial statute is reasonably
capable of two constructions that construction should be preferred which
furthers the policy of the act and is more beneficial to those in whose
interest the act may have been passed; and the doubt, if any, should be
resolved in their favour. So in case of an exception which curtails the
operation of beneficent legislation, the court, in case of doubt, would
construe it narrowly so as not to unduly expand the area or scope of operation.
The court will also not readily read words which are not there and introduction
of which will restrict the rights of persons for whose benefit the statute is
intended.
The construction
of a statute must not so strain the words as to include cases plainly omitted
from the natural meaning of the language. Therefore, Beneficial Construction is
a way of relaxing the strict principles of interpretation and that is the
reason why it is called beneficial construction.
6. Restricted
Construction- Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage
susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects
or consequences which would result from it, for they often point out the real
meaning of the words. There are certain objects which the legislature is
presumed not to intend, and a construction which would lead to any of them is
therefore to be avoided. It is not infrequently necessary, therefore, to limit
the effect of the words contained in an enactment (especially general words),
and sometimes to depart, not only from their primary and literal meaning, but
also from the rules of grammatical construction in cases where it seems highly
improbable that the words in their wide primary or grammatical meaning actually
express the real intention of the legislature. It is regarded as more
reasonable to hold that the legislature expressed its intention in a slovenly
manner, than that a meaning should be given to them which could not have been
intended.
Sometimes the
meaning of words is so plain that effect must be given to them regardless of
the consequences; but more often a construction should be adopted with due
regard to the consequences which must follow it[7].
7. Construction
to avoid collision with other provisions- If two sections of an Act cannot
be reconciled, as they may be absolute contradiction, it is often said that the
last must prevail[8].
But this should be accepted only in the last resort. “It is not doubt true
that if two sections of an Act of Parliament are in truth irreconcilable, then prima
facie the latter will be preferred. But these are the arguments of the last
resort. The first duty of the court must be, if the result is fairly possible,
to give effect to the whole expression of the parliamentary intention”[9].
8. Generalia
Specialibus non derogant- “Generalia specialibus non derogant”
literally means “the general does not detract from the specific”.
Where there are
general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application
without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation,
you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed,
altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any
indication of a particular intention to do so[10].
If a special
provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general
provision. Apart from resolving conflict between two provisions in the Act, the
principle can also be used for resolving a conflict between a provision in the
Act and a rule made under the Act[11].
9. General
Clauses Act, 1897- The General Clauses Act, 1897, is a consolidating and amending
act. The purpose of the act is to avoid superfluity and a repetition of
language; and to place in a single Act, provisions as regards definitions of
words and legal principles of interpretation which would otherwise have to be
incorporated in many different Acts and Regulations. The definition and the
rules of interpretation contained in the General Clauses Act have to be read in
every Statute governed by it, provided the statute does not contain anything repugnant
to them in the subject or context or does not exhibit a different intention[12]. The Act is also
applicable for interpretation of the Constitution[13].
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Complete List of Jurisprudence Notes
[1] R
v. Inhabitants of Ramsgate, (1827) 6 B&C 712.
[2] Lord
Evershed, Master of the Rolls, Preface to Wilson and Galpin, 1962.
[3] Bengal
Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661.
[4] Smith
v. Hughes, [1960] 2 All E.R. 859.
[5] CIT
v. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352.
[6] Collector
of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijay singhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd.,
Jamnagar, AIR 1961 SC 1549.
[7] Lord
Reid, Brown v. National Coal Board, 1962 AC 574 at page 587.
[8] Wood
v. Riley, (1867) LR 3 CP 26.
[9]
Lord Evershed, Eastbourne Corporation v. Fortes Limited, (1959) 2 ALL ER
102.
[10] The
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur & Ors., AIR 1980 SC
2181.
[11] Venkateshwar
Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828.
[12] State
of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84.
[13]
Article 367 of the Constitution of India.
nice article very useful to students like me.
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