In the present
article, we will discuss the three famous tests used by the courts to ascertain
ratio decidendi.
1.
Wambaugh’ Test
2.
Halsbury’s Test
3.
Goodhart’s Test
Wambaugh’s
Test
The Inversion
Test propounded by Wambaugh is based on the assumption that the ratio
decidendi is a general rule without which a case must have been decided
otherwise. Inversion Test is in form of a dialogue between him and his student.
He gave following instructions for this[1]:
1. Frame
carefully the supposed proposition of law.
2. Insert in the
proposition a word reversing its meaning.
3. Inquire
whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good and had had
it in mind, the decision could have been the same.
4. If the answer
is affirmative, then, however excellent the Original Proposition may be,
the case is not a precedent for that proposition.
5. But if the
answer be negative, the case is a precedent for the Original Proposition and
possibly for other propositions also.
Thus, when a
case turns only on one point the proposition or doctrine of the case, the
reason for the decision, the ratio decidendi, must be a general rule
without which the case must have been decided otherwise[2]. A proposition of law
which is not ratio decidendi under the above test must, according to
Wambaugh, constitute a mere dictum.
However, Rupert Cross
criticized the Inversion Test on the ground that "the exhortation to frame
carefully the supposed proposition of law and the restriction of the test to
cases turning on only one point rob it of most of its value as a means of
determining what was the ratio decidendi of a case, although it has its
uses as a means of ascertaining what was not ratio".
Thus, the merit
of Wambaugh’s test is that it provides what may be an infallible means of
ascertaining what is not ratio decidendi. It accords with the generally
accepted view that a ruling can only be treated as ratio if it supports
the ultimate order of the court[3].
Halsbury’s
Test
The concept of
precedent has attained important role in administration of justice in the
modern times. The case before the Court should be decided in accordance with
law and the doctrines. The mind of the Court should be clearly reflecting on
the material in issue with regard to the facts of the case. The reason and
spirit of case make law and not the letter of a particular precedent[4].
Lord Halsbury
explained the word “ratio decidendi” as “it may be laid down as a
general rule that that part alone of a decision by a Court of Law is binding
upon Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and inferior Courts which consists of
the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which the question before the
Court has really been determined. This underlying principle which forms the
only authoritative element of a precedent is often termed the ratio decidendi”.
In the famous
case of Quinn v. Leathem[5],
Lord Halsbury said that:
“Now, before
discussing the case of Allen v. Flood[6]
and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character
which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before,
that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved,
or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be
found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed
and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are
to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually
decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem
to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is
necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law
is not always logical at all.”
Thus, according
to Lord Halsbury, it is by the choice of material facts that the Court create
law.
Goodhart’s Test
In 1929,
Goodhart had argued that the ratio of a case must be found in the reasons
for the decision and that there is no necessary connection between the ratio
and the reasons. He laid down following guidelines for discovering the ratio
decidendi of a case[7]:
1. Ratio
decidendi must not be sought in the reasons on which the judge has based
his decision.
2. The reasons
given by the judge in his opinion are of peculiar importance, for they may
furnish us with a guide for determining which facts he considered material and
which immaterial.
3. A decision
for which no reasons are given does not necessarily lack a ratio;
furthermore, the reasons offered by a court in reaching a decision might be
considered inadequate or incorrect, yet the court’s ruling might be endorsed in
later cases – a ‘bad reason may often make good law’.
4. Thus, ratio
decidendi is whatever facts the judge has determined to be the material
facts of the case, plus the judge’s decision as based on those facts. It is by
his choice of the material facts that the judge creates law.
If we accept
Goodhart’s conception of ratio decidendi, we could explain why
hypothetical instances are unlikely to be accorded the same weight as judicial
precedents as hypothetical instances are by definition obiter dicta[8].
Also, this conception of ratio decidendi links the doctrine of precedent
with the principle that like cases be treated alike. Any court which considers
itself bound by precedent would come to the same conclusion as was reached in a
prior case unless there is in the case some further fact which it is prepared
to treat as material, or unless fact considered material in the previous case
is absent[9].
Part I: Definition of ratio decidendi
Part II: Supreme Court on ratio decidendi
Complete List of Jurisprudence Notes
[1]
Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.,
1892).
[2]
Rupert Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, Oxford University
Press, 1991.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Halsbury’s Laws of England.
[5] [1901]
UKHL 2.
[6]
[1898] A.C. 1.
[7]
Goodhart, Determining the ratio decidendi of a Case.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Cambridge University
Press.
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