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Let us discuss the classic case
of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation[1].
This case gave birth to the famous ‘Wednesbury Principle’. In the present post,
I will give facts, arguments advanced and discussion done by the court in this
case.
1. Facts
2. Arguments Advanced
3. Discussion by the Court
4. Ratio Decidendi
Facts
1. The proprietors of a cinema
theatre in Wednesbury, sought to obtain from the court a declaration that a
certain condition imposed by the Corporation of Wednesbury, on the grant of a
licence for Sunday performances in that cinema was ultra vires.
2. The powers and duties of the
Local Authority are to be found in the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932. That
Act legalized the opening of cinemas on Sundays, subject to certain specified
conditions and subject to such conditions as the licensing authority think
fit to impose.
3. The licensing authority are
the licensing authority set up under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, and in
this case is the Corporation of Wednesbury.
4. In the present case, the Corporation
of Wednesbury imposed the following condition in their licence:
"No children under the
age of fifteen years shall be admitted to any entertainment, whether
accompanied by an adult or not."
Arguments Advanced
1. The Cinema Owner argued that
it was not competent for the Wednesbury Corporation to impose any such
condition and said that if they were entitled to impose a condition prohibiting
the admission of children, they should at least have limited it to cases where
the children were not accompanied by their parents or a guardian or some adult.
2. The main argument was that the
imposition of that condition was unreasonable and that in consequence it
was ultra vires the corporation.
Discussion by the Court
The court started by saying that
it is true that the discretion must be exercised reasonably. But, what
does that mean? The word ‘unreasonable’ is frequently used as a
general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a
person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He
must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He
must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has
to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and
often is said, to be acting "unreasonably."
Similarly, there may be
something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within
the powers of the authority.
The court cited Lord Justice
Warrington in Short v. Poole Corporation[2], and gave the example
of the red-haired teacher who was dismissed because she had red hair. According
to the court, that is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking
into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might
almost be described as being done in bad faith.
The court further said that while
saying that the decision of the authority is wrong because it is unreasonable, the
cinema owner is really saying that the ultimate arbiter of what is and is
not reasonable is the court and not the local authority.
According to the court, this is
where the strength of the arguments of the Cinema Owner broke down.
“It is just there, it seems
to me, that the argument breaks down. It is clear that the local authority are
entrusted by Parliament with the decision on a matter which the knowledge and
experience of that authority can best be trusted to deal with. The
subject-matter with which the condition deals is one relevant for its
consideration. They have considered it and come to a decision upon it.
The court said that nobody could
say that the well-being and the physical and moral health of children is not a
matter which a local authority, in exercising their powers, can properly have
in mind when those questions are considered.
The Court further iterated that:
“It is true to say that, if
a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere.”
But, according to the court, the
facts of the present case do not come anywhere near anything of that kind.
Finally, the court justified its
reasoning by saying that:
“It is not what the court
considers unreasonable, a different thing altogether. If it is what the court
considers unreasonable, the court may very well have different views to that of
a local authority on matters of high public policy of this kind. Some courts
might think that no children ought to be admitted on Sundays at all, some
courts might think the reverse, and all over the country I have no doubt on a
thing of that sort honest and sincere people hold different views. The
effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the
correctness of one view over another. It is the local authority that are set in
that position and, provided they act, as they have acted, within the four
corners of their jurisdiction, this court, in my opinion, cannot interfere.”
The court also said that it is
entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing
whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into
account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take
into account matters which they ought to take into account.
Once that question is answered
in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that,
although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters
which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In
such a case, again, the court can interfere. However, the present is not of
that sort. Hence, the Appeal by the Cinema Owner was dismissed.
The power of the court to
interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision
of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and
concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by
acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them.
Ratio Decidendi
1. When Law grants discretion to
a Local Authority, the law recognizes certain principles upon which that
discretion must be exercised, but within the four corners of those principles,
the discretion is an absolute one and cannot be questioned in any court of law.
Thus, the Court is not a Court of Appeal.
2. If a decision on a
competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable Authority could ever
have come to it, then the courts can interfere.
In the next post, we discuss the development of 'Wednesbury Principle' in Indian Scenario.
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