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Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Muralidhar @ Gidda & Anr. Versus State of Karnataka- Credibility of Dying Declaration

The Karnataka High Court in Bengaluru.

Today, the Apex Court of this country gave a very pleasing and forward judgment. I agree with each and every word of the Supreme Court in this case. I will simply state the facts in brief. It is not necessary for us to go into the details. 6 persons were acquitted by the Court of Sessions (Sections 302, 307, 144, 148 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860). The only significant evidence in this case was a Dying Declaration. However, the Trial Court was not convinced by it and acquitted the accused persons.

The State preferred an Appeal before the High Court against this acquittal. The High Court convicted five of the six persons on the basis of the dying declaration alone as it found the dying declaration to be genuine and credible.

The only question before the honourable Supreme Court was that whether the High Court was justified in upsetting the view of the trial court on re-appreciation of the evidence?

The Supreme Court started by citing Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1]:

“The High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as:

(1) The views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;

(2) The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial;

(3) The right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and

(4) The slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”

In Surajpal Singh v. State[2], it was held that:

“The High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.”

After citing these and many other cases, the court iterated following well-established principles:

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court,

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal,  

(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court.  It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. 

(iv) Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice,  the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and

(v) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view.  The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.

After laying down the abovementioned principles, the court came to the facts of the present case and made following observations about the dying declaration.

a. PW1 (Dr. Latha) did not certify that Pradeep (the person who gave dying declaration) was in a fit condition to make any statement.

b. The recording of Pradeep’s statement by a constable as dictated by someone else (Sub-Inspector) in this situation raises many questions. The Constable also admitted that he did not record the statement in the words of the maker (Pradeep) but wrote the statement as dictated by the Sub-Inspector.

c. A Doctor in the hospital where Pradeep was being treated admitted over-writing with regard to the time written on the Dying Declaration.

d. The trial court observed that the names of accused Gunda (A-3) and Swamy (A-5) appear to have been inserted in different ink later on.

e. The trial court was of the view that the Dying Declaration did not inspire confidence and the credibility of the Dying Declaration has not been established to the satisfaction of the court.

The Supreme Court concluded by saying that sanctity is attached to a dying declaration because it comes from the mouth of a dying person.  If the dying declaration is recorded not directly from the actual words of the maker but as dictated by somebody else, this by itself creates a lot of suspicion about credibility of such statement and the prosecution has to clear the same to the satisfaction of the court.

Thus, the Supreme Court finally held that, “it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial court on the basis of evidence on record was not a possible view. The accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt which was rightly given to them by the trial court.”

The High Court while upsetting the judgment of acquittal did not keep in view the well-established principles in hearing the appeal from the judgment of acquittal. Hence, the appeals were allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.




[1] Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [AIR 1934 Privy Council 227].
[2] Surajpal Singh v. State; [AIR 1952 SC 52].

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