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Monday, October 28, 2013

Jan Choukidar Verdict and Amendment to the Representation of the People Act: An Analysis


In my last post related to this topic, I said that an amendment has been brought by the Parliament in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to nullify the effects of C.E.C. v. Jan Choukidar judgment. Here is an analysis of that amendment. This amendment act is called the Representation of the People (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2013.


Old Provision

Section 7 (b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - "disqualified" means disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State.

New Provision

Section 7 (b) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 - "disqualified" means disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State under the provisions of this Chapter, and on no other ground.

Effect of this amendment

The wordings of this amendment are quite clear. Previously, there was no statutory bar on declaring a candidate disqualified on the grounds which were not mentioned in Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. As per the case of C.E.C. v. Jan Choukidar, a candidate could be disqualified on the basis of a conjoint reading of Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and various sections [Section 2 (e), Section 4, Section 5 and Section 62 (5)] of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. But, this is no longer possible after this amendment. The description of disqualification in the Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and other provisions not mentioned in Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 can no longer be used and read to disqualify a candidate under Section 7 (b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Thus, Section 7 (b) has precluded itself from all types of disqualifications save mentioned in the Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This leaves no ambiguity while interpreting the said provision of law.



Old provision

Section 62 (5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - No person shall vote at any election if he is confined in a prison, whether under a sentence of imprisonment or transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a person subjected to preventive detention under any law for the time being in force.

New Provision

Section 62 (5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - No person shall vote at any election if he is confined in a prison, whether under a sentence of imprisonment or transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a person subjected to preventive detention under any law for the time being in force.
Provided further that by reason of the prohibition to vote under this sub-section, a person whose name has been entered in the electoral roll shall not cease to be an elector.

Effect of this Amendment

In the case of C.E.C. v. Jan Choukidar, the Supreme Court held that a person who has no right to vote ceases to be an elector under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and is therefore not qualified to contest elections.

According to the court, when a person is behind the bars, his right to vote gets temporarily suspended. Thus, he is not allowed to vote even though his name is entered in the electoral rolls. But, under article 326 of the Constitution of India, an essential qualification to be a voter or an elector is to be able to vote. In this case, he is clearly not able to vote by virtue of Section 62 (5). Hence, he ceases to be an elector. And when a person ceases to be an elector, he is disqualified from contesting elections (Section 4 and Section 5 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951).

Such was the reasoning of the court. This amendment clearly nullifies the reasoning and verdict of the court in C.E.C. v. Jan Choukidar. According to this amendment, a person won’t cease to be an elector merely because he is behind bars and is temporarily not able to cast his vote. Thus, now persons who are behind bars will again be able to contest in the elections.



Retrospective effect to the abovementioned amendments

Section 4 of the Representation of the People (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2013 - Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended by this Act, shall have and shall be deemed always to have effect for all purposes as if the provisions of this Act had been in force at all material times.

Effect of this Provision

This provision in the amendment is the last nail in the coffin of C.E.C. v. Jan Choukidar verdict. By giving retrospective effect to these amendments, the legislature has made sure that the Jan Choukidar will not have any effect for whatever little time it was in force. Jan Choukidar verdict has been made a complete nullity and the legal framework has been made as if the verdict never existed.



Opinion

What can I say? The Supreme Court did what it deem fit to be right and the legislature did what it deem fit to be right. One side of the picture is that now criminals can contest elections even while they are behind the bars. The other side of the picture is that it won’t be possible to prevent a person from contesting elections merely because that person is an accused and has been denied bail.

A settled principle of our criminal jurisprudence is “innocent until proven guilty”. The presumption of innocence is heavily in favour of the accused until he is declared guilty by a competent court of law. This amendment will prevent cases where frivolous charges are framed against an innocent person and because of which, he is not able to contest elections.

Imagine a situation where a person who is an accused and has been denied bail is prevented from contesting elections. Later on, he is acquitted by the court. An election happens only once in five years. His right to contest elections would have clearly been violated in such a case. This amendment precisely aims to protect such a situation from happening.

No matter what the media and the civil society says, I firmly believe that such an amendment was needed. The Supreme Court ought to have considered the implications of the Jan Choukidar verdict. It clearly failed to do so. Hence, an amendment was imperative in this regard.

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