GENERAL
MANAGER, CANARA BANK & OTHERS v. KULDEEP RAJ SHARMA [1]
Under Regulation 15 (2) r/w Regulation 15(3)(b) of the Canara Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, an employee is only entitled to be granted such proportion of pay and allowances as the competent authority may direct. In this case, the respondent was not entitled to the grant of full pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended.
Under Regulation 15 (2) r/w Regulation 15(3)(b) of the Canara Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, an employee is only entitled to be granted such proportion of pay and allowances as the competent authority may direct. In this case, the respondent was not entitled to the grant of full pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended.
Normally,
the period of absence from duty in such cases is not to be treated as a period
“spent on duty”. It is only in cases where the competent authority specifically
directs that such period of suspension should be treated as having been “spent
on duty” that the competent authority is required to give reasons in writing.
No reasons are necessary when the period of suspension in cases falling under
sub-Regulation 15(2) is treated as “not spent on duty”.
GOVIND SINGH RANA AND ORS v.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION [2]
While making
contractual appointments preference should be given to those who have worked as
daily wage employees and even within the daily wage employees preference would
be as per length of service rendered.
This would mean
that some kind of a seniority list of daily wage employees should be drawn up.
While making contract appointment, if found suitable, employment would be
offered on contract basis giving preference to the old hands.
MAHIPAL SINGH v. UOI & ORS [3]
Under
Rule 8(d)(ii) of the Delhi Police Punishment and Appeal Rules 1980, the Disciplinary Authority could choose to
inflict the penalty entailing reduction in pay (but not permanently) or
deferment of an increment (temporarily or permanently).
ARUNA MEENA v.UNION OF INDIA AND ANR [4]
Beyond
the cut-off date prescribed in an advertisement, by which necessary documents
and information have to be made available; the date being sacrosanct, if by the
cut-off date relevant documents are not supplied the candidate concerned not to
be treated as eligible.
MUKESH KUMAR YADAV AND ANR v. GOVT.OF NCT OF DELHI
& ORS [5]
Whenever cut-off
dates are prescribed and it specifies that not only the applications but
annexures thereto have to be filed on or before cut-off date any corrective
action after the cut-off date would be irrelevant.
PURAN SINGH v. DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF
PRINTING & ORS [6]
It is
settled law that if a person has a good cause for non- appearance on a
particular date, past conduct has to be ignored. Thus, the inevitable
conclusion has to be that the report of the Inquiry Officer is vitiated
inasmuch as the inquiry has been concluded post haste and the petitioner was
prevented from a cause beyond his control to appear before the Inquiry Officer.
LAXMI NARAIN v. UNION OF INDIA [7]
There is no
legitimate expectation of a person who is a casual labourer or a contractual
employee for regularization inasmuch as there cannot be any assurance by the
Government or its instrumentalities to give a regular status or a confirmed
temporary status to such employees which violates the constitutional mandate.
GURU NANAK PUBLIC SCHOOL V. ARJUN [8]
Section
25 of the Delhi School Education Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil
court in respect of matters in relation to which the authorities under the said
Act are empowered to act. The Courts/tribunals established under the I.D. Act
are not Civil Courts.
The remedies
available under Delhi School Education Act and I.D. Act are concurrent.
Exclusion of jurisdiction of the Courts/tribunals under the I.D. Act cannot
lightly be inferred. The respondent could have elected to invoke its remedy
under the Delhi School Education Act, or under the ID Act. Since he had made his
election to invoke the remedy under the ID Act, he cannot be denied the relief
thereunder only because he could have also sought his remedy under the Delhi
School Education Act.
BIRENDER SINGH SHEKHER V. UOI AND ORS [9]
The
ground of alleged arbitrariness or unfairness in regard to the procedure adopted
by the confirming officer, by not putting the petitioner to notice about the
likelihood of an adverse noting in the opinion of the Court is not made out as
the concerned authority under Rule 106 of BSF Rules, 1969 has to “record its
decision”. Therefore, while responding to the notice under Rule 21, the
petitioner was not dealt with unfairly and that he had full opportunity to
question the observations and recommendations made by the Inspector General/competent
authority. Those observations were of a prima facie nature.
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