Hi Everyone
From now on, we will be
publishing short notes and ratios of various Delhi High Court Judgments. We hope
that this research work will be useful for lawyers as well as academicians. For now, due to obvious reasons and time constraints, it is not possible to give a designed outlook to these cases. The cases we
are going to put up now are the latest High Court Judgments. This is just the beginning.
Stay tuned for more updates.
RAKEYSH
OMPRAKASH MEHRA & ANR VS GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.[1]
An FIR was filed against
“Delhi 6” for using casteist remarks and discrimination against Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The court quashed the FIR holding :
“Though censorship of
films constituting prior restraint is justified under the Indian constitution,
yet the censors have to make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom,
thereby leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life.
It has to take into
consideration what effect the movie is likely to produce on the minds of its
viewers for whom the movie was intended.”
AAKASH
Juvenile through his father MALKHAN SINGH VS. N.C.T OF DELHI & ANR.[2]
While deciding the
procedure that a Juvenile Justice Board should adopt in order to compute the
age of a person when it is not known. It was held “that medical opinion from
the Medical Board should be sought only when matriculation certificate or
equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first
attended or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat or municipality is not available.”
The statute requires
the court or the Board only to make an:
|
“inquiry” and in what
manner that inquiry has to be conducted is provided in the JJ Rules.
They are not expected
to conducted a ‘trial’ as contemplated under the Criminal Procedure Code.
|
GLAXO
GROUP LIMITED & ORS vs. MR. RAJESH BANSAL & ORS[3]
a decree of permanent
injunction was passed and a cost of Rs. 5 Lakhs was imposed in a suit filed by
Glaxo Group Ltd. for infringement of trademark of ‘betnovate’ by using the term
‘benate’ by the defendant.
Thus holding the use of
the term amounted to infringement of the trade mark and was done in order to
encash the goodwill of the company.
LETS
ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY SERVICES PVT. LTD. Vs. MANOJ DAS[4]
A Petition was filed
for the appointment of an arbitrator on the basis of an unsigned draft
agreement, which was recorded in emails.
It was held that “the
provisions of Section 7 of the Act envisage that the existence of an
Arbitration Agreement can be inferred from a document signed by the parties, or
an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams, or other means of telecommunication
which provide a record of the Agreement.”
It is clear that in the
absence of signed agreement between the parties, it would be possible to infer
from various documents duly approved and signed by the parties in the form of
exchange of e-mails, letter, telex, telegrams and other means of
telecommunication.
PARAMJEET
SINGH vs STATE[5]
A father killed his 12
year old daughter, and caused grave injuries on his two other children and
wife. The Court held upholding his conviction, and rejected his plea of
insanity holding :
“Crimes are often
committed or are a result of mental disorder/abnormality as in the cases of a
serial killers like David Berkowitiz but the test of “insanity” as a legal term
is restrictive and more precise. The legal test is that the accused because of
disease of mind should be crippled by defect of reason from knowing the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it, then he did not know
that it was wrong (morally) or was contrary to law.”
“the appellant was
mentally disturbed and had quarrelsome nature, but it cannot be said that he
was incapable of understanding the nature and character of his acts and
consequences thereof qua to him and others.”
“The fact that he was
mentally disturbed did not mean that he was in the state of confusion or
suffering from mental debility to the extent required and mandated by Section
84 IPC.”
M/S.
RALSON INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. M/S. ADHUNIK TRANSPORT ORGANISATION LTD.[6]
Whether all suits would
be barred against a sick company under SICA?
Allowing the present review application, it
was held that unless the dues are admitted by the sick company in a sanctioned
scheme or is admitted before the court where the same suit is filed, no
permission is required under Section 22 of SICA. It was held that before
Section 22 could be invoked, the proceedings against the company are
necessarily to be of the nature of ‘execution, distress or the like’.
All suits including
that of recovery are not hit by Section 22 (1) of the SICA, but, only those
suits which have the effect of execution, distress or like action against the
properties of sick company, which would be hit by this provision.
INDIA
TRADE PROMOTION ORGANISATION vs. INDIA INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE MACHINERY
EXHIBITIONS SOCIETY[7]
The dispute in the
appeal pertained to as to which whether Article 24 or 113 of the Limitation Act
would apply. Article 24 states that limitation would be 3 years from receipt of the money, whereas Article
113 states that limitation would be 3 years from the date of right to sue. It was held that Article
24 ought to apply wherever the defendant has received money which in justice
and equity belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which in law render the
receipt of it, a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.
Meaning thereby, that
the plaintiff should have a right immediately on tendering the money to seek
refund there and then.
When it was pure and
simple, a deposit, in anticipation of a contract and when given, it was not the
intention of the plaintiff to take it back. That is the true test to determine
whether Article 24 applies.
SMT.
REKHA CHANDRA vs. NATIONAL BANK FOR AGRICULTURE & RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORS[8]
The petitioner had
challenged her transfer orders by which she was being shifted from Delhi to
Goa. The court refused to interfere in the petition on the following grounds -
“It is settled law that
employment carries with it an obligation to serve the employer at whichever
place the employee is required to be posted in accordance with the exigencies
of service or administrative requirements.”
“Orders of transfer are
ordinarily not interfered by the court save in grave exceptions or in ex facie
violations of the rules or policies of an organization. If courts would start
interfering in transfer orders, no organization will be able to function
effectively.”
CHAMAN
LAL & ORS. Vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION[9]
The petitioners where
convicted in the trial court and were sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years.
They had appealed against this conviction, the said appeal was admitted
although not decided. Meanwhile they had undergone 2 years in Jail. The court
granted them bail and held
“while admitting the
appeal, we tell the appellant that we have admitted your appeal inasmuch as we
find prima facie merit in the same but unfortunately, we have no time to hear
your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, till the time we hear your
appeal you must remain in jail, even though you may ultimately prove to be
innocent. What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the
minds of the public.”
“It is therefore,
absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in
the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to
hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court
should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise,
release the accused on bail.”
SATNAM
DASS NARANG vs. D.D.A.[10]
An allotment letter was
issued by DDA, which was served by DDA at the address given by the allottee.
However the allottee had by that time shifted to a new address. Thus the
allottee remain unserved and the allotment of the plot was challenged. The
court dismissed the challenge holding
“Once the appellant had
shifted from the Faridabad House, he ought to have informed DDA about change of
his address and sought incorporation of the new address in its record. It is
not as if the appellant was not aware of the necessity to intimate change of
address to the respondent.”
“Similarly, on his
being transferred from the dispensary in South Patel Nagar, the appellant
should have intimated DDA about change of his occupational address so that in
the event of allotment, the demand letter could be sent to him either at his
residential address or at his occupational address. Having not done so, the
appellant was clearly negligent in taking care of his own interests.”
“DDA had issued advertisements
in leading newspapers, along with the registration numbers of those whose
demand-cum- allotment letters were received back unserved is to bring it to the
notice of the registrants, particularly those whose addresses have changed that
the allotment letters dispatched to them having been received unserved, they
should immediately contact DDA to make payment and obtain possession of the
flat allotted to them.”
“But, the obligation of
DDA, in our opinion does not extend beyond sending such letters to the last
residential and last occupational address disclosed by the registrants to it
and no external enquiry needs to be made.”
SUGEETA
CHHABRA vs. HARISH NAYAR[11]
An application under
Order 6 Rule 17 was filed by the defendant in order to change his stand taken
in the written statement, wherein he had admitted that the suit property was a
self-acquired property, to say that it was an HUF property.
The court dismissed his
application holding :
“if permission is
granted to the defendant to amend the written statement, as prayed for, then it
shall cause serious injustice to the plaintiff inasmuch as it will result in
permitting the defendant to take contradictory and inconsistent pleas in
negation of the position taken in his original written statement.”
“This would amount to
permitting the defendant to change the very nature of his original defence and
set up an entirely new case, which had not been taken by him in the written
statement as originally filed. In fact, it is not merely a case of taking
inconsistent pleas or addition of new grounds of defence, but an attempt on the
part of the defendant to build up an entirely different and mutually
incompatible defence.”
DALJIT
SINGH vs. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI & ORS.[12]
A retired government
servant was granted only a package deal amount instead of the total medical
cost incurred by him in the hospital. He challenged the said decision of the
government claiming the full reimbursement.
Held that “merely
because the Government does not revise the package deal amount under the
Medical Attendance Rules from time to time a person cannot be denied actual
medical costs, and there has to be reimbursement of the actual medical expenses
incurred.”
[1] W.P.(CRL) 1188/2009 &
CRL.M.A. 9918/2009
[2] CRL. REV. P.
510/2012
[3] CS(OS) No.
1013/2007
[4] ARB.P. 250/2012
[5] Crl. Appeal No.
586/2012
[6] REVIEW APPLN.
1/2013, C.M. 2 & 3 of 2013 in CM(M) 1010/2012
[7] RFA (OS)
10/2007
[8] W.P. (C)
No.2673/2012
[9] CRIMINAL M.B.
NOS.1044/2011, 1045/2011, 1046/2011, 1047/2011 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.757 OF
2011
[10] LPA NO. 16/2013
[11] I.A.
No.8998/2012 CS(OS) No. 1342/2011
[12] WP(C)
No.16651/2006
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