This
is a case relating to Reservation in Panchayati Raj in Tribal Areas. I won't go into the facts. This
case is very important as it protected the interests and rights of people in
the Tribal Areas. It laid down following propositions:
1. The
court upheld cent percent reservation constitutional in case of seats of
Chairpersons of Panchayats in Scheduled Areas. The Court said that this pattern of
reservation has been designed only for Scheduled Areas which merit such
exceptional treatment. It relied on a MP High Court Judgment (Ashok Kumar Tripathi v. Union of India) which said that:
“So
far as the high percentage of reservation exceeding 50% for members and 100%
reservation for Chairpersons in Scheduled Areas is concerned, it is supportable
even on the touch stone of Article 14 of
the Constitution. It is a protective
discrimination permissible on a reasonable classification of different sections
of the society into more oppressed- backwards and the forwards. The
peculiar situation of the inhabitants of the Scheduled Areas whose conditions
have to be improved to educate them in the local Government, a step towards an
effort to achieve their assimilation in the normal stream of democratic life at
par with the advanced and the forward sections of the society justifies such
classification. In the Scheduled Areas in reality if an aboriginal has to
contest an election against a member of the forward section of the society, the
contest would be totally unequal as of a weak and ignorant against wealthy and
powerful. In a contest of this nature the weak and ignorant hardly can get a
chance to become a member and in any case it would be impossible for him to
reach to the helm of the institution as Chairperson. If he by chance becomes a Chairperson in the Panchayat consisting
of elected members from advanced sections of the society and the members are in
majority, it would be well-nigh impossible for the Chairperson of the reserved
category to effectively function and to save his elected status. The
necessity, therefore, is that the Chairperson should be from the reserved
category so that he is in a position to effectively function without inhibition
and threat of no confidence motion against him to remove him from his office.”
2. The
Court also upheld the reservation exceeding 50% limit in Panchayati Raj
Institutions. It cited various reasons for it:
a. Article 243-M(4)(b) permits `exceptions
and modifications' in the application of Part IX to Scheduled Areas.
b. The
Court cited Indra Sawhney’s case:
“809. From the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion
that follows is that the reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of
Article 16 should not exceed 50%.
810. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put
out of consideration. certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great
diversity of this country and the people. It
might happen that in far-flung and remote areas the population inhabiting those
areas might, on account of their being put of the mainstream of national life
and in view of conditions peculiar to and characteristical to them, need to be
treated in a different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may become
imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to be exercised and a special
case made out.”
c. The rationale behind imposing an
upper ceiling of 50% in reservations for higher education and public employment
cannot be readily extended to the domain of political representation at
the Panchayat-level in Scheduled Areas. With respect
to education and employment, parity is maintained between the total number of
reserved and unreserved seats in order to maintain a pragmatic balance between
the affirmative action measures and considerations of merit.
d. The
inherent difference between the nature of benefits that accrue from access to
education and employment on one hand and political participation on the other
hand. While
access to higher education and public employment increases the likelihood of
gradual socio-economic empowerment of the individual beneficiaries, involvement
in local-self-government is intended as a more immediate measure of protection
for the individual as well as the community that he/she belongs to.
e. Lastly,
the court cited Ashok Kumar Tripathi v. Union of India:
“At the Bar it was argued that such excess policy of
reservation is bound to create bad blood between the two classes and would be a
serious deterrent to bring such oppressed classes into the mainstream of
democratic life. There are arguments for and against this. In the matters of policy the best judges are the Legislators who are
closer to the society and represent them. They have a study of the society and
have advantage of reports based on sociological surveys made by experts.
They better understand the needs of the society and the various sections
forming it. It is not for this Court to
enter into this forbidden arena and lay down a policy of reservation. The
argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners only shows that the attitude of
the members of the advanced sections of the society towards castes and tribes
continues to be more of competition than compassion. The reservation in various
walks of life made in their favor for the last 50 years of the independence has
not been successful in improving their socio-economic condition and have not
made them effective participant in the democratic process. The necessity is
still felt by the legislators in making special provisions for them in the
Constitution and the laws to ensure their effective participation at least in
the local self-Government institutions as a first step to give them due share
of governance in the Assemblies of the States and the Parliament. The argument
that the policy of reservation would segregate them rather than assimilate them
with the common stream is one for the legislator to consider on the basis of
existing social situation. In the
matters of policy, wisdom of legislature cannot be questioned or the policy
laid down cannot be upset by the Court which is ill equipped to deal with the
subject.”
3. The Court also upheld that aggregate
reservation amounting to 80% of the seats in Panchayats located in Scheduled
Areas does not amount to an unreasonable limitation on the rights of political
participation of persons belonging to the general category.
The court said that while the
exercise of electoral franchise is an essential component of a liberal
democracy, it is a well-settled principle in Indian law that such rights do not
have the status of fundamental rights and are instead legal rights which are
controlled through legislative means (N.P. Ponnuswami's Case). In
the context of reservations in Panchayats, it can be reasoned that the
limitation placed on the choices available to voters is an incidental
consequence of the reservation policy. In this case, the compelling state
interest in safeguarding the interests of weaker sections by ensuring their
representation in local self-government clearly outweighs the competing
interest in not curtailing the choices available to voters.
Observations:
In this case, all the issues were thoroughly
discussed by the Court. With regards to the first issue, I agree with the court
that Socio-economic equality and political equality are not the same thing and
protective discrimination is permissible under Article 14. The whole purpose of
political equality is to give voice and representation to the weaker sections of
the society. It has no relation with the economic status of a person. This is
especially needed in case of Tribal areas because Tribal Areas are pretty
secluded from the rest of the population and most of the times, there voice and
demands don’t even reach the state since they are not adequately represented in
the political machinery of the state.
With respect to 50% reservation ceiling, the court
rightly differentiated Indra Sawhney’s case with the present case and laid that
it is Article 243M(4)(b) which empowers Parliament to go for such kind of
reservation. Also, Ashok Kumar’s case was very relevant since it
rightly lays down that Legislature represents the true will of the people and
its wisdom cannot be questioned by the Court for the Court is ill-equipped in
this area.
However, I am not very sure about the third issue.
Without even discussing the concept of election and voting, the court out
rightly rejected this issue on the ground that since Right to vote or contest
in an election is not a fundamental right and is merely a statutory right, the
question of unreasonable limitation does not arise. I think this issue needs a
more careful study and more sound reasons should have been provided by the
Court if it thinks so. This has been the attitude of the Apex Court in all the
cases which talk about Right to Vote. However, a larger bench of the Supreme
Court is discussing on this issue specifically in relation to negative voting. Still,
every case is to be decided on its own merits. Hence, the court should have given
reasons in this case as well as to rights of political participation of persons belonging to the general
category. Just because right to vote is a creature of a statute, it does not
mean that the whole political participation of a class of persons can be
neglected.
Overall, I
feel that it is a very sound and a much needed judgment since Tribal Areas are
being exploited badly in our country and this judgment must have given them a
breath of relief.
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