Pages

Thursday, August 16, 2012

An Interesting Case on the Concept of "Domicile"


While going through Private International Law and the concept of Domicile, I came across this very interesting case. I have tried to summarize it as briefly as possible. Hope it is of some help. 


Facts: 

An election took place on 23.2.1986 and the revision petitioner herein and seven others contested the same. The first respondent herein was duly declared elected as President of a Panchayat.
The election of the first respondent in the said election was challenged by the petitioner by way of an election petition before the Election Tribunal. Against the order of the Election Tribunal, the first respondent preferred a Civil Revision Petition before the High Court.
The judge felt that one important question to be decided in this case is whether the first respondent herein is a citizen of India.
The Election Tribunal came to the conclusion that the first respondent herein is a citizen of India and as such it upheld her election.

Issues: 

1.      Whether the petitioner was domiciled in India on 26th January, 1950 when the Constitution of India came into force?
2.      Whether one of her parents was born in the territory of India?

Arguments by the Petitioner: 

1.      The first respondent herein was born in Malaysia in 1942, that on 26th January 1950 when the Constitution of India came into force, she was only a minor,
2.      That she being a minor, her domicile on the date of 26th January 1950, should be the domicile of her father in terms of Ss. 7 and 14 of the Indian Succession Act.
3.      That regarding the birth of first respondent's father, her mother alone has deposed as a witness, that her evidence cannot be taken as evidence in the eye of law, that at best it can be taken as a hearsay and that there is no other evidence to show the birth place of the first respondent's father.

Arguments by the Respondents: 

1.      The first respondent herein was a minor on 26th January, 1950 and that so far as the domicile is concerned; the domicile of her father will be applicable to her.
2.      It was argued that Art. 5 of the Constitution of India came into force on 26-11-1949 as per Art. 394 of the Constitution of India. All parties proceeded on the basis that Maria Pillai and the father of the first respondents were citizens of India and the fact that his domicile of origin is India is also not disputed.
3.      That the burden lies on the petitioner to prove that the domicile of origin is changed. The mere fact that he was a resident of Malaysia and died will not show that he was domiciled in Malaysia.
4.      It is true that the first respondent's father was residing in Malaysia, but no citizenship of Malaysia was obtained and that his idea was not to reside in Malaysia permanently. Evidence given by her mother was referred to show that her father was born in India that her father domiciled in India, that she was a minor when the Constitution of India came into force on 26.1.1950 and as such according to Art. 5 of the Constitution of India, the first respondent herein is also a citizen of India.

Judgment: 

In the present case, the Election Tribunal said that the first respondent's parents were born in India and as such, as per Article 5(b) of the Constitution of India, both the parents of first respondent were born in India. The High Court agreed with the Election Tribunal on the point that Article 5(a) of the Constitution will not apply to the case on hand since the first respondent herself admitted in her evidence that she was born in Malaysia.
The High Court examined the next question framed by the Election Tribunal which was whether the first respondent herein was a 'domicile' in India as per Article 5 of the Constitution. On a perusal, it can be seen that in Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Art. 5 of the Constitution, the term 'domicile' has not been defined.
In Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain[1], it has been held that it is impossible to lay down an absolute definition of 'domicile' In Craignish v. Craignish[2], Chitty, J. has given the simplest definition of the term 'domicile';
"....That place is properly the domicile of a person in which his habitation is fixed without any present intention of removing therefrom."
In that case, the Supreme Court has further observed as follows:
"....There must be the factum and there must be the animus. The residence need not be continuous but it must be indefinite, not purely fleeting. The intention must be a present intention to reside forever in the country where the residence has been taken up...."
We see that in all the cases mentioned, the nationality of persons domiciled in India is immaterial. My personal view is that mere residence is not domicile. There must have been some intention on the part of the first respondent herein or by her father to settle down at Malaysia permanently.
Further, the High Court analyzed the domicile status of the mother and the father. It said that the father of the first respondent has never lost his domicile in India and he was a citizen of India. There is no evidence to show that the father of the first respondent was settled in Malaysia with the intention not to come back to India.
The respondent has acquired properties in India as an Indian citizen. This respondent has also given birth of her male children when she used to visit Malaysia to join her husband who was in Malaysia. But at all the relevant times the respondent has her Indian domicile and she never terminated her Indian domicile. She never intended to terminate her Indian domicile as well. The very fact she has studied in India as an Indian citizen having Indian passports as Indian citizen not only to her but also to her children will also decidedly prove by itself that this respondent continues to be an Indian citizen.
The High Court said that it is well settled that, under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court should not interfere with the decisions of the Tribunal even if there is an error of law or on facts. It is also well settled that simply because this Court can come to another conclusion, it will not be a ground for interfering with Article 227 of the Constitution. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on both sides, the Election Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the first respondent is a citizen of India as per Article 5 of the Constitution of India. No reason was found to set at naught the well-considered order of the Election Tribunal. The Civil Revision Petition stood dismissed.

Ratio: 

The concept of domicile is not uniform throughout the world and just as long residence does not by itself establish domicile, brief residence may not negative it. But residence for a particular purpose fails to answer the qualitative test for the purpose being accomplished, the residence would cease. The residence must answer "a qualitative as well as a quantitative test", that is, the two elements of FACTUM ET ANIMUS must concur.

Critique: 

On the point of Evidence, I fail to understand how the mother’s hearsay statement was accepted by the Tribunal. However, it was within the power of the Tribunal to accept such statement since Tribunals are not bound by procedural laws and decide each case on its own merits. 
On the point of Domicile, I agree with the court that both quality and quantity must be taken into account while deciding such an issue. Brief residence does not definitely negate the Domicile.
I really appreciate the way the court brought article 227 into picture. Article 227 is an extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and it must be exercised sparingly. The court was right to this effect.





[1] 1955 Cri.L.J.152
[2] 1892 (3) Ch 180 (A) 

No comments:

Post a Comment